Introduction
Inspired by ideas of "new public management", health system reforms often aim to improve productive efficiency in the delivery of health services by re-aligning provider incentives (Cutler 2002) . Major health reforms introduced to the English NHS in the early to mid 2000s are a case in point. These reforms were introduced by a Labour administration led by Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Chancellor Gordon Brown, who subsequently became Prime Minister from 2007-10.
The "Blair/Brown" health reforms included waiting time targets for elective surgery, case based hospital payment, and new entry of private sector hospitals into the market for publicly funded NHS patients. A primary aim of these reforms was to give hospitals stronger incentives to reduce waiting times and length of stay for elective surgery. Both waiting times and length of stay did indeed fall substantially as the reforms were phased in and, at least in the case of waiting time targets, there is good research evidence that this was a causal effect: a well conducted difference-in-difference study using Scotland as a control group (Windmeijer et al. 2009 ).
Given the importance of equity goals to all publicly funded health systems, however, it is natural to be concerned about possible trade-offs between efficiency and equity. One such concern relates to potential perverse incentives in relation to hospital admission decisions. In theory, hospitals placed under pressure to reduce waiting times and increase patient throughput, within tight budget constraints, might respond not by improving productive efficiency but instead by selecting in favour of short-staying, low-cost patients ("cream skimming") and/or against longstaying, high-cost patients ("patient dumping"). If poor patients tend to stay much longer in hospital and cost much more to treat, hospitals might thereby face an incentive directly or indirectly to discriminate on the basis of socio-economic status (Tudor-Hart 2006, Cookson et al. in press).
For example, imagine a hospital orthopaedic department treats 200 elective hip replacement patients a year with average length of stay 5 days, plus 50 patients with average length of stay 10 days. If the hospital could somehow avoid treating the 50 long staying patients, this would release 500 bed days which could be put to alternative use -for example, in treating 100 additional short staying patients to reduce waiting times.
To influence hospital admission decisions, however, the predicted differentials in length of stay and cost would have to be substantial, given that social and professional norms of medical ethics militate against socio-economic and other forms of discrimination in health care. This paper therefore aims to provide some evidence, in the context of the English NHS, about whether socio-economically disadvantaged patients do indeed stay substantially longer in hospital than other patients.
Our paper does aim to measure actual selection behaviour by NHS hospitals or to identify whether the "Blair/Brown" health reforms led to increased selection behaviour. Our analysis cannot determine the magnitude of any pre-existing selection behaviour in 2001/2 or whether selection behaviour changed over time. Instead, our paper has the more modest aim of investigating the size of potential incentives for NHS hospitals to select against patients on the basis of deprivation, using length of stay differentials between different patient groups as a proxy for these potential incentives. We focus mainly on the year 2001/2, prior to the Blair/Brown health reforms which we hypothesise may have strengthened the link between length of stay differentials and both financial and non-financial selection incentives for NHS hospitals. We then also examine subsequent years, to see how these potential incentives have changed over time.
To avoid problems of case mix confounding when comparing length of stay between heterogeneous patients and treatment categories, we focus narrowly on the specific tracer procedure of elective primary total hip replacement. This is a good test case for our socioeconomic patient selection hypothesis, because hip replacement is a common procedure with substantial length of stay and considerable clinical uncertainty about appropriate use. If efficiency-oriented health reforms generate substantial and widespread incentives for socioeconomic patient selection, then one would expect to find such incentives in relation to hip replacement. Hip replacement is also a useful and well-studied tracer procedure for examining issues of health care inequality, and there is considerable evidence of pre-existing socioeconomic inequality in use of hip replacement in the English NHS prior to the period under study in this paper (Cookson, Dusheiko and Hardman, 2007) . Finally, hip replacement is also of interest in its own right, as a high volume procedure (the NHS does about 40 thousand elective primary total hip replacements a year -see table 2 below) with a high political profile during the period under consideration, due to severe waiting time problems and particular difficulty in meeting government waiting time targets.
We use anonymous patient level hospital records covering all NHS Hospital Trusts in England, including data on length of stay, small area deprivation, age, sex, number and type of diagnoses, type of procedure, and hospital of treatment. This includes almost all NHS funded operationsapart from the small fraction carried out under the "Independent Sector Treatment Centre" programme (see below) -but does not include privately funded operations. We use a small area level index of income deprivation as a proxy for socio-economic status, since routine patient level data on income and other aspects of socio-economic status are not available. We use patient level repeated cross section data for an unbalanced panel of all NHS Hospital Trusts followed for seven financial years 2001/2 through 2007/8, which enables us to examine how far the answer to our headline question changes over time throughout the reform period.
We find that patients from the most deprived decile of English small areas stay about 6% longer than other patients in 2001/2, falling to 2% by 2007/8. This differential is small compared with observed differentials in relation to age and co-morbidity. For instance, patients aged 85 or over stayed 57% longer than other patients in 2001/2, rising to 71% by 2007/8, and patients with seven or more diagnoses stayed 58% longer than other patients in 2001/2, rising to 73% by 2007/8. This suggests that, in relation to hip replacement surgery, the poor do not cost much more -but the very elderly and the very sick do.
Background
Two decades ago, following the introduction of the Medicare prospective payment system in 1983, a classic US study found that poorer patients stay longer in hospital and cost more to treat (Epstein, Stern and Weissman, 1990) . That study of 16,908 patients admitted in 1987 to five Massachusetts hospitals found that patients in the lowest third of socio-economic status (by patient level income, occupation and education) had between 3 to 30% longer stays and probably also required more resources, after adjusting for case-mix using Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), age, and severity. Unfortunately, however, it is not straightforward to generalise the findings from this US study to a different health system such as the present day English NHS, which has a different set of health care institutions, incentives and professional practice styles and which serves patients facing a different set of socio-economic conditions.
We examine a period of persistently falling length of stay, allowing us to examine whether Since the introduction of the NHS prospective payment system, the price of each elective and non elective procedure has been based on the national average cost of producing the corresponding HRG two years before, as reported by each hospital. Hospital costs are recorded in the national "Reference Cost" dataset, which supplies information on costs in every NHS Hospital Trust in England at level of HRG produced. This Reference Cost dataset is the most disaggregated level of information on hospital costs routinely collected in the NHS, and microcosting data itemising resource use for individual patients is not available.
Methods
Regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between patient level length of stay and small area income deprivation, controlling for other factors. Patient level covariates include age, sex, number of diagnoses, type of diagnosis and type of hip replacement (with or without bone cement). Area income deprivation, age, and number of diagnoses were divided into ordered groups and modelled using dummy variables, to allow for non-linear relationships with length of stay. Age was divided into five age groups: age 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84 and 85+ . Number of diagnoses was divided into seven groups: 1 through 6 diagnoses and 7 or more diagnoses.
We use three different models to allow for national time trends and heterogeneity in hospital level factors such as efficiency, clinical practice style and accounting practices: We also conducted sensitivity analysis to test for possible age-deprivation and diagnosisdeprivation interactions. We exclude long-staying outliers with length of stay greater than 60 days, making up 1,023 cases or just over 0.4% of the total. In sensitivity analysis we include patients with length of stay no greater than 240 days (975 extra patients). The full results are available from the authors on request.
Trends in adjusted length of stay (Table 7) were obtained using the indirect standardization procedure described in O'Donnell et al. (2008) . This allows us to purge the effect of confounders on length of stay (e.g. the patient's age or severity) without removing the influence of the key covariateof interest (i.e. socio-economic group) that might be correlated with the confounding variables.
Data
We use anonymous individual hospital records for all patients admitted for elective hip replacement in English NHS Hospital Trusts for each financial year from 2001/2 through 2007/8.
We include all elective admissions involving primary total prosthetic replacement of the hip joint. The latter are identified under HRG H01, H02, H80, H81 and OPCS-4 codes W37.1, W38.1 and W39.1 as reported under the main operation of the first episode of care. These OPCS-4 codes represent the three main variants of this procedure -"using cement", "not using cement", and "not elsewhere classified". We exclude patients coming for revisions or conversions of previous hip operations as their length of stay might partially depend on the quality of care received in past admissions. We also exclude other types of hip replacement operation such as hybrid prosthetic replacements, resurfacings, and prosthetic replacement of the neck of femur.
We exclude from the analysis 7 NHS Hospital Trusts with a volume of activity lower than 25 hips operations per year (255 observations Hospital records are extracted from the national "Hospital Episode Statistics" database as continuous inpatient spells (CIPS), which allow for transfers between different consultants both within the same hospital and between hospitals. The standard unit of activity available to users of the Hospital Episode Statistics database is the "finished consultant episode" (FCE). This is defined as the time the patient spends under the care of the same consultant. However, this can only measure length of stay for the period during which the initial hip replacement procedure is performed, before the patient is transferred to another consultant or hospital for any further treatment that may be necessary. The use of CIPS allows us accurately to measure length of stay for the full period of care from admission to discharge, including treatments for any complications following the first FCE and transfers to different providers of care. The computation of CIPS requires a complex matching algorithm (Lakhani et al., 2005) . We use the CIPS matching algorithm set out in Castelli, Laudicella and Street (2008) , pp 14-20 Section 2. A non-trivial proportion of elective hip replacement patients are transferred to another consultant or hospital: 5.5% of continuous inpatient spells with length of stay less than or equal to 60 days involved two or more finished consultant episodes, and 3.2 % involved a transfer to another hospital.
The number of diagnoses reported in the HES dataset runs from 1 to a maximum of 14 from 2002/3 onwards (though only a maximum of 7 diagnoses in 2001/2). Number of diagnoses is sometimes referred to as number of co-morbidities (Hamilton and Bramley-Harker, 1999 ).
However, this indicator also includes diagnoses acquired during the first FCE of hospital stay, including any surgical complications and hospital acquired infections. So to some extent this indicator may pick up variations in quality of care, as well as variations in patient co-morbidity. 
Results

Descriptive statistics
Tables 4 and 5 about here
Tables 4 and 5 present unadjusted means and standard deviations in length of stay by age group and number of diagnoses group. The differences in both means and standard deviations between these age and diagnosis groups are considerably larger than those between deprivation groups.
For instance, patients aged 85 or older stay 97% longer than patients age 45-54 in 2001/2, with a standard deviation 154% higher, rising to 123% longer with a standard deviation 183% higher by 2007/8. And patients with seven or more diagnoses stay 71% longer than patients with only one diagnosis in 2001/2, with a standard deviation 112% higher, rising to 106% longer with a standard deviation 149% higher by 2007/8.
We now turn to the regression analysis, to examine how far these unadjusted relationships are modified after adjusting for other patient characteristics and Trust level factors. Table 6 presents the regression results from models 1, 2 and 3 as applied to data from our baseline year of 2001/2. All three models show a similar pattern and magnitude of results. The results from OLS models 1 and 2 are easy to interpret, as each coefficient represents an absolute difference in mean length of stay in days compared with the relevant comparator group. The results of model 3 are mainly of interest as a sensitivity analysis, and give us confidence about the large sample asymptotic normality assumption underlying OLS models 1 and 2. The coefficients of model 3 can be interpreted as percentage changes in mean length of stay compared with the mean, and so to compare them with the OLS coefficients they can be multiplied by the mean length of stay of 9 days.
Regression analysis
We prefer fixed effects model 2 to random effects model 1, for two main reasons. First, our main interest lies in estimating individual level associations between deprivation and length of stay, after controlling for hospital level factors, rather than estimating hospital level associations after controlling for individual level factors (Rice and Jones 1997). Second, the estimates from model 1 may be slightly biased due to correlation between patient characteristics and hospital random effects, as suggested by the variance decomposition analysis presented below. So in what follows we focus on the results from fixed effects model 2.
In fixed effects model 2, after controlling for patient characteristics (age, sex, number and type of diagnoses, uncemented procedure or not), patients from the least deprived tenth of areas on average stay 0.9 days less than patients from the most deprived tenth of areas in 2001/2. This is smaller than the corresponding 1.5 day unadjusted gap between most and least deprived decile groups, and is only slightly larger than the adjusted 0.8 day gap between men and women.
The gap in length of stay between most and least deprived decile groups rises to 1.0 days in random effects model 1. Estimates from model 1 are influenced by variation between hospitals, as well as variation between patients, and so this suggests that Hospital Trusts with aboveaverage lengths of stay tend to admit a slightly above-average proportion of income deprived patients -an issue explored further below.
Age group and diagnosis group remain substantially more powerful determinants of length of stay after adjusting for other factors. In fixed effects model 2, the adjusted length of stay gap between patients aged 85 and over and patients aged 45-54 in 2001/2 is 7.74 days (slightly lower than the unadjusted gap of 8.39 days), and the adjusted gap between patients with 7 or more diagnoses and one diagnosis is 7.18 days (slightly higher than the unadjusted gap of 7.00 days).
In sensitivity analysis, there were no significant, substantial or systematic interactions between age and deprivation or between diagnosis group and deprivation. The lines also illustrate the persistent year-on-year falls in length of stay throughout the period, each one of which is larger than the corresponding year's length of stay gap between most and least deprived decile groups. That is, for any given year, the average difference in length of stay between most and least deprived decile groups is smaller than the average difference in length of stay between this year and next year. Table 7 shows adjusted length of stay differentials by year, for deprivation, age and co-morbidity using fixed effects model 2. Unlike the figures in tables 3, 4 and 5, these adjusted figures allow for correlations between deprivation, age, co-morbidity. For example, deprivation differentials in Table 7 show the gap in average length of stay between top and bottom deprivation deciles after purging heterogeneity in age, sex, number and type of diagnoses across the two groups. This is the difference in length of stay that one would observe if all the confounding characteristics (i.e. age, sex, number and type of diagnoses) were the same across socio-economic groups. Trends in table 7 allow for the fact that deprived and elderly people may also tend to have more diagnoses -and attempt to identify a "purer" association purged of the influence of these other factors. Figure 3 shows the adjusted relationships between length of stay, age group and income deprivation decile. Although there is a deprivation gradient in length of stay within each age group, this gradient is dwarfed by the larger differences between age groups. Figure 4 shows the predicted relationships between length of stay, number of diagnoses and deprivation decile group. Again, the deprivation gradient within each diagnosis group is dwarfed by the larger differences between diagnoses groups. However, this association is largely driven by four outlier hospitals with relatively high mean patient deprivation scores, so must be interpreted with caution.
Figure 4 about here
Conclusion
On average, NHS elective hip replacement patients living in more income deprived areas of England do stay slightly longer in hospital than patients living in less income deprived areas.
However, this association is small. Age and co-morbidity are considerably more powerful determinants of length of stay for elective total hip replacement than small area deprivation. This is clearly illustrated in table 7, which compares patients with the relevant "high risk" characteristic (i.e. age over 85, seven or more diagnoses, and the most deprived tenth) with all other patients, after adjusting for other patient characteristics using our preferred fixed effects model 2. This is perhaps the most appropriate comparison for an unscrupulous hospital manager interested to know how large a saving in length of stay could be made by selecting against (or "dumping") patients with that particular "high risk" characteristic and instead treating other patients. After adjusting for other patient characteristics, patients over 85 stayed 6.06 days longer than other patients in 2001/2 -i.e. 57% longer. Patients with seven or more diagnoses stayed 6.23 days longer than other patients in 2001/2 -i.e. 58% longer. Whereas patients from the most deprived decile group of small areas only stayed 0.62 days longer than other patientsi.e. 6% longer. Table 7 also shows that the absolute differentials fell during the period 2001/2 to 2007/8, in line with general year-on-year reductions in length of stay. Interestingly, however, the relative differential fell to 2% by 2007/8 in the case of deprivation, whereas the relative differentials for age and co-morbidity grew during this period (to 71% and 73% respectively). This suggests that NHS hospitals have been relatively successful in reducing length of stay for long staying patients such as the elderly and those with severe, multiple co-morbidities. In relative terms, however, this means that age and co-morbidity are even more powerful determinants of length of stay in 2007/8 than they were in 2001/2; and small area deprivation even less powerful.
One reason that people from deprived areas stay slightly longer in hospital on average than others is that they may have more co-morbidity -such as obesity, heart conditions, and other health problems -and hence take longer to recover. Our regression analysis partly allows for this, by controlling for the number and type of diagnoses. However, we do not allow for the severity of co-morbidity. Other possible reasons are that patients from deprived areas may have less pleasant and supportive household environments to return to, and there may be sociocultural factors relating to patient and professional behaviour, such as the quality of communication and diagnosis and patient adherence to medication and recovery regimes.
Our main conclusion is that deprivation differentials in length of stay are small compared with differentials associated with age and co-morbidity. There may be incentives for NHS hospitals under pressure to cut waiting times to avoid offering elective hip replacements to very elderly patients and patients with substantial co-morbidity. However, any incentives to avoid offering elective hip replacements to patients from deprived areas appear negligibly small. In the case of elective hip replacement, the poor cost a bit more -but not much more. 
